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Neoliberal Dispositif and the Rise of Fundamentalism: The Case of Pakistan
Masood Ashraf Raja, Ph.D.
University of North Texas
mraj@unt.edu

Abstract
While developmental theorists rely heavily on analysis of macro and micro economic
theories and developmental sequencing, not much attention is paid to the undeniable linkage
between the post-seventies liberalization of global economies and the rise of different kinds
of religious fundamentalism. This article suggests that there is a strong connection between
neoliberal economics and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. The rise of Islamic
fundamentalism in Pakistan can be directly linked to the insertion of performative religious
acts, predominantly Islamic, into the national public sphere during the rule of Zia-ul-Haq.
Since that time, the public sphere in Pakistan has been increasingly Islamized, and the space
of minorities within the public sphere has constantly diminished. Furthermore, this rise of
fundamentalism is inextricably linked with the deregulation policies adopted for Pakistan.
Thus, as the state fails in its redemptive functions, the private religious charities encroach
upon the civic functions of the state, which enables such entities to shape and imbue the
public consciousness of their beneficiaries with an exclusivist and chauvinistic view of the
world. The fundamentalist Islamic ideologies, that of the Taliban for example, must posit a
threatening “other” in order to mobilize support and legitimate their own view of the nation;
In most of cases, minorities become an easy target for this process of othering. In case of the
Taliban, the same principles of exclusion are also extended to various Muslim sects that may
not conform to the purist view of religion espoused by the Taliban.

Journal of International and Global Studies

22

There is tendency in the metropolitan Western scholarship about Islam to capture the
figure of the fundamentalist in its presence as a fully realized subject of its own will by
foreclosing any discussion of the material conditions that construct such a subjectivity. In such
an engagement with the figure of the fundamentalist, the genealogy of fundamentalism is traced
directly to the pernicious ideologies that construct such a subjectivity. Such explanations of the
Islamic fundamentalism, obvious especially in the works of American conservative scholars,
presuppose that a subjectivization such as that of the Taliban can, somehow, take place outside
of history and is hence, completely unavoidable.
“Fundamentalists,” suggests Terry Eagleton, “are basically fetishists,” and “a fetish is
whatever you use to plug some ominous gap” (2003, p. 208). Eagleton further suggests that what
the fundamentalists fear the most is “nonbeing,” which they attempt to fill “with dogma” (2003,
p. 208). Thus, as a cursory reference to Eagleton’s discussion of the fundamentalist suggests, the
gap that the so-called fundamentalist attempts to fill necessarily preexists the desire to fill it; it is
part of being human in the world, for “nonbeing is what we are made of” (Eagleton, 2003, p.
208). Eagleton recuperates this sense of being in the world through an acute reading of David
Hume. The basic assumptions of Hume’s discussion of human understanding can be gleaned
from one interesting passage provided in the beginning of his An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding:
But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty,
we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined
within very narrow limits, and all this creative power of the mind
amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing,
augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses
and experience. (Hume, 1977, p. 11)
It is this particularly empiricist and experiential explanation of thought and ideas by Hume that
allows Eagleton to provide an instructive suggestion about the impossibility of a stable self, for,
in Eagleton’s words, “because we are historical animals, we are always in the process of
becoming, perpetually out ahead of ourselves,” (2003, p. 208) and that is one reason why we
“can never achieve the stable identity of a mosquito or a pitchfork” (Eagleton, 2003, p. 208).
Resultantly, Eagleton suggests, “[W]e cannot chose to live non-historically: History is quite as
much our destiny as death” (2003, p. 209).
The emergence of the figure of a Talib (the Pashto pluralization of which, “Taliban,” has
now become an established concept in English) can also not be traced and discussed outside of
history. Even though some American conservatives suggest that “the Arab and Islamic worlds
are not products of Western colonialism and Imperialism,” (Palmer, 2007, p. 235)—thus tracing
the problems of Islam to its own sacred texts—the figure of the Talib is not only a production of
Islam but is also a composite figure constituted by the power of global capitalism. I suggest that
the rise of neoliberalism and neoliberal globalization is the ultimate plane of emergence for the
Taliban as well as other global fundamentalist movements 1. As such, what I am suggesting is
that the Talib is not a non-historical figure, and, therefore, its emergence as a subject cannot be
understood without the material and ideological terrain within which this subject attempts to fill
the hole of its nonbeing with dogma. Furthermore, the rise of this figure also impacts the larger
culture in which it seeks to fill its emptiness. I will, henceforth, provide a brief discussion of
neoliberalism as a system but also as a conceptual and material ground for the emergence of the
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figure of the fundamentalist and then trace the impact of this configuration on the role and space
of minorities within the nomos of the Pakistani nation-state.
While the “globalization” part of the term “neoliberal globalization” is fairly transparent
and often invoked in defense of a universalist cultural paradigm (and to challenge all antiglobalist discourses), it is the “neoliberal” aspect of this term that has more drastic consequences
for the global periphery. According to Saskia Sassen, the restructuring of the global economy
constructs a specific kind of global economy that involves “the formation of a global market for
capital, a global trade regime, and the internationalization of manufacturing production” (Sassen,
2007, p. 14). Despite claims of the global economy bringing development and progress to the
entire world, Sassen also points out, the power dynamics of this new global economic regime are
still lopsided, and, importantly, “the center of gravity of many transactions . . . lies in the North
Atlantic region” (Sassen, 2007, p. 58). This also means, in other words, that while the laborintensive manufacturing jobs are exported to the global periphery, the upper management and
flow of profits is still directed toward the metropolitan centers. Thus, globalization, despite
claims of its leading to a free market economy, is still a system of global hierarchies in which the
so-called “playing field” is not as even (nor is the world as “flat”) (Friedman) as one is led to
believe.
The neoliberal aspect of globalization has the more pernicious effects, and I will now
briefly discuss what I mean and understand by neoliberalism. John Rapley provides an extensive
list of particular attributes that mark the neoliberal regime, some of which are cited below.
In the neoliberal regime, the locus of accumulation shifts more
unambiguously to the private sector. Via politics of privatization,
the state renounces its direct role in accumulation, and shifts its
function from ownership to regulation . . . . But it is not simply
accumulation that shifts toward the private sector; so too does
distribution. The welfare state is pared back and streamlined: some
functions are left to the private sector altogether (private charities
have taken up much of the work of poor relief in some countries,
particularly in the Third World) . . . . Thus, the government both
reduces taxes and shifts the burden of taxation from income to
consumption, with an eye to putting more money in the hands of
those most likely to invest it. (2004, p. 40)
What becomes obvious through this brief reference to neoliberalism is that, within neoliberalism,
there is a drastic shift in the functioning of the nation-state and its engagement with the people. A
neoliberal state, by focusing on accumulation, must forsake the welfare functions of the state in
order to create efficiencies that ensure a stable, consumption-based economy. This, then, ends up
privatizing nearly all redemptive functions of the state. Now, Rapley’s critique of neoliberal
globalization is based in the dissonance between these two important functions of the state:
accumulation and distribution. Rapley theorizes these two functions of the state by presupposing
certain legitimizing strategies essential to the creation and sustenance of political regimes. The
dominant political regimes, Rapley suggests, “depend on the assent of the mass support bases
over which they preside,” (2004, p. 33) and, accordingly, “when an elite can consolidate its
hegemony over rival elites, a regime comes into being” (2004, p. 33). Thus, the neoliberal
regime, with the attributes cited above, is perfect in its accumulative function, for those who
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have money are likely to make more, but it fails miserably in its distributive function. It is
precisely this concentration of wealth upward and the failure to distribute wealth downward that
Rapley posits as the ultimate moment of crisis for the current neoliberal state, for, as he sees it, a
regime enters its moment of crisis as a result of a “sudden change in the distribution of resources”
or a situation that “brings rival elites onto the scene” (Rapley, 2004, p. 32). Having failed to
legitimize itself through good works or the redemptive functions of a welfare state, the state, thus,
seeks other modes of legitimation to maintain the balance required to sustain the elite-masses’
consensus, and it is this moment that becomes the ‘originary moment,’ so to speak, for the rise of
a more Islamized and fundamentalist public sphere in Pakistan.
In most developed economies, the state, having lost the mode of legitimizing power,
transforms into a security state, and so “the defense of the territory—the ‘safe home’—becomes
the pass-key to all doors which one feels must be locked” (Bauman, 1998, p. 117) in order to
safeguard against all perceived threats. Thus, securing the bodies and, by extension, the
possessions of the citizens becomes the new form of a mostly biopolitical regime.
In the case of Pakistan, the rise of neoliberalism coincides with two important markers of
Pakistani history: the Soviet-Afghan war and the beginning of the illegitimate dictatorship of
General Zia-ul-Haq. These two events reconfigure the legitimizing structure of the Pakistani
nomos 2 both in symbolic and material terms. The symbolic shift in the Pakistani nomos was
already evident in the unfolding of the 1977 elections. For the first time in the fraught electoral
history of Pakistan, two parties (the Pakistan People’s Party and the Islamic Democratic
Alliance) fought for the very definition of what would and could constitute the Bios and the Zoē
of Pakistani nomos. While the Pakistan People’s Party mobilized, despite its actions against the
Ahmadies, a sort of politics that was seemingly inclusive and would have included the Zoē (the
non-Muslims) within the larger nomos of the state, the Islamic political parties, through an
Islamic perception of the nation, stood for a specific Bios (the Muslims), and thus had the
capacity to exclude the minorities as Zoē by default.
It is in this symbolic scenario that the post-election coup of General Zia-ul-Haq unfolds,
for as he had ousted the so-called secular Prime Minister, he thus mobilized the symbolic
affinities and political alignments of Bhutto’s opponents: the Ulama. Thus, Zia-ul-Haq’s
Islamization project is deeply caught up within a zone of indistinction, in which religion and
“qualified life” can no longer be differentiated but rather come together to legitimize his claims
to leadership. Let us not forget that the mid-seventies is also the very period in history when the
global economy is being restructured and shaped by a process we now understand to be
neoliberal globalization. We must also interpret the rise of Islamism (and its attendant
fundamentalism) within the very specifics of Pakistani history, for, after all, one person, no
matter how charismatic or powerful, cannot reshape the symbolics of an entire nation. As Aijaz
Ahmad points out, “the precise developments which are causing this rapid shift within Islamicist
movements, from moderate electorally inclined Islamism, to armed extremist movements” (2008,
p. 25) must be read within their spatial and temporal specificities.
While India has always provided the necessary foil, in the shape of an outside threat, for
the Pakistani leaders to structure and articulate their messages, Zia-ul-Haq also found the
Afghan-Soviet war to be another legitimizing narrative. Called the “Afghan Jihad” in the local
parlance, the Afghan-Soviet war, while providing General Zia-ul-Haq with an ideal material
condition to foster his rule, also centers Jihad as the main signifier of a purely Muslim identity
within Pakistan, specifically, and also more generally within the Islamic world. This combination
of material circumstances—a failing distributive regime and a “religious” war next-door—
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provide ideal bases for Islamizing Pakistan and for the emergence of a subjectivity called the
Taliban.
This shift to an Islamized identity is more performative than substantive, as the emphasis
is on the appearances and not necessarily on the deeper aspects of religion. In this sense, one
could say that the particular attempt to Islamize Pakistan, though enacted through ritual,
appearance, performance and law, is in direct conflict with the importance accorded to such
rituals and practices by Al-Gazaali in Ihya Ulum Al din, a work that, according to some scholars,
“achieved the reconciliation of Sufism and orthodoxy” (Campanini, 1996, p. 264) by
emphasizing, beside other things, the role of muhabbah, love, in the life of a true Muslim. The
daily rituals of Islamic practice, therefore, were intended to represent a means by which to create
a sort of human subject who could love God and His creations. The problem with the rise of
Islamism during Zia-ul-Haq’s regime and its eventual unfolding in Afghanistan as well as in
Pakistan is that the rituals and performative acts are taken to be the ends (as opposed to the
means) of this process. Ritual, thus, loses its transformative power and becomes the absolute
horizon of spiritual desire and quest.
In such a scenario, all those who do not appear to be Muslims (or in the worst case
scenario, are not Muslims at all) become suspect, become “bare life,” a life excluded from the
body politic and, sometimes, a life worthy of being ended, without legal repercussions or, at the
least, any kind of remorse. Furthermore, during the Zia-ul-Haq regime, this bare life, this
killable/controllable life becomes a crucial part of the body and law of the sovereign state. My
claim relies heavily on Georgio Agamben’s theorization of bare life and sovereignty, so I
provide below a brief excerpt from his work:
The Sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill
without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice
and a sacred life—that is, life that may be killed but not
sacrificed—is the life that has been captured in this sphere. (1998,
p. 83)
Thus it is, Agamben adds, that “what is captured in the sovereign ban is a human victim who
may be killed but not sacrificed: homo sacer,” and, Agamben further adds, “the production of
bare life is the originary activity of sovereignty” (1998, p. 83). In the case of the Islamization of
Pakistan during the Zia-ul Haq regime, the capture and creation of this homo sacer, this bare life,
is a natural outcome of the state policies, for, after all, only what is not Islamic—(be it culturally
or juridically defined)—is absolutely essential to constructing an “Islamic” public sphere and
system of law. That is to say, the sovereign—in this case the state of Pakistan and Zia-ul Haq—
cannot exist without the presence, capture, and isolation of this elusive figure: the bare life. The
minorities, naturally, provide this necessary ingredient for the stabilization of an Islamic
sovereign power. That the minorities in Pakistan have always had the role of the homo sacer is
undeniable. The recent case of death penalty against Aasia Bibi (whose death sentence is
discussed later in this essay) is a good example of that: Her punishment in juridical terms is an
expression of the full force of the law on the body of bare life in order to forestall and strengthen
the writ of the sovereign law. Also, in the popular domain, I have heard, that a local Maulvi
offered five hundred thousand Pakistani rupees to anyone who would kill this woman, which is
another example of the importance of bare life even to the self-legitimizing strategies of
powerful “Muslim” private citizens.
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There are two other important ways in which the system of power changes in Pakistan
after the Zia-ul-Haq coup: (1) those in power structure their system through “constituting power”
instead of “constituted power” and (2) a return to Islamic jurisprudence (Sharia) accentuates the
differences between active rights and passive rights of citizenship. Let me first unpack the four
terms that I have used to describe this shift within the Pakistani public sphere.
Agamben suggests that the most acute aspect of the “paradox of sovereignty” (1998, p.
39) lies in understanding “the problem of constituting power and its relation to constituted power”
(1998, p. 39). Agamben provides the following appraisal of the role of constituting power in
contemporary times:
Today, in the context of general tendency to regulate everything by
means of rules, fewer and fewer are willing to claim that
constituting power is original and irreducible, that it cannot be
conditioned and constrained in any way by a determinate legal
system and that it necessarily maintain itself outside every
constituted power. The power from which the constitution is born
is increasingly dismissed as a prejudice or a merely factual matter,
and constituting power is more and more frequently reduced to the
power of revision foreseen in the constitution. (1998, pp. 39-40)
Of course, Agamben’s discussion of the differences between the “constituting” and “constituted”
power is specific to his European experience. In the case of Pakistan, during the Zia-ul-Haq
regime, the constituting power becomes transcendental and timeless and comes to haunt the
constituted power at every turn. A return to Sharia, even if it is a gesture, is the ultimate assertion
of an originary constituting power into the very fabric of the constituted power of the Pakistani
state. We must also remember that this prominence of an originary and absolute constituting
power is posited as an ultimate solution against the symbolics of people’s power mobilized by Z.
A. Bhutto. The mere fact that his political party was named the “Pakistan’s Peoples Party,”
regardless of whether or not it truly was a “people’s” party, captured and excluded any Islamic
constituting power and replaced it with the will of the people as the ultimate constituting power
for the constitution. This gesture (and that is all that it was) had the potential to unleash the most
democratic and transformative politics, for if the people were the ultimate force of construction
and revision, then none of them could be excluded or devolved into bare life through law or in
the name of an originary, unchangeable, extra-human—divine—constitutive power.
Another revolutionary aspect of invoking the people, or the citizens, was that such a
politics could not posit an exclusivist view of the people, for in such a symbolics, all national
subjects were citizens possessing active rights and not divided between those with “active rights”
and those with “passive rights.” This takes me to a brief explanation of the terms “active” and
“passive” rights. While explaining the development of the discourse of rights in the Western
tradition, Agamben suggest that “at the very moment in which native rights were declared to be
inalienable and indefeasible, the rights of man in general were divided into active rights and
passive rights” (1998, p. 130). Needless to say, this distinction between holders of active and
passive rights is inherently gendered, racialized, and theologized. In such a scenario, those
deemed “proper” citizens tend to hold active rights, with a right to actively participate within the
political sphere of a nation, whereas those with passive rights are in a sense relegated to the bare
life and, as such, can only hold the right to live within the national political sphere, without
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access to any form of political power. Thus, there is a constant drive, Agamben argues, in the
modern biopolitical sphere of a national space to “redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes
and separates what is inside from what is outside” (1998, p. 131).
While this applies to the rise of the Islamized nation of Pakistan, there are, however,
certain specific permutations of the inside and the outside, the active and passive bodies within
the national space. The increased Islamization of the Pakistani public sphere has immediate
consequence for women and minorities: Both in juridical terms as well as through social
pressures, the women and minorities, despite being native citizens of the Pakistani nation-state,
are transformed into passive bodies, bodies discouraged from being active right-holders within
the public sphere. And this transition is accomplished by foregrounding the defining power of
the constitutive power of the state—the Sharia—as an absolutely unchallengeable body of law,
as opposed to the constituted power of the Pakistani constitution. Thus, the constitutive power,
instead of receding and becoming suspect or irrelevant, captures these bodies with full force as
the only living power within the political sphere. Pakistan, sadly, has never recovered from this
reconstruction and articulation of constituting power as an absolute, irreducible presence.
Surprisingly, however, the figure of the refugee, posited by Agamben as the ultimate emblem of
crisis in the national space, is not seen as an outsider, at least not within the sovereign’s attempts
to legitimize itself. In fact, the figure of the Afghan refugee becomes the ultimate symbol of
masculinity and a legitimizing emblem for Zia-ul-Haq and his followers. Thus, at the very
moment that neoliberal globalization is unfolding in the world, the Pakistani nation’s selflegitimation is connected to the most international symbol of the global human crisis: the refugee.
This refugee, however, is not an average displaced figure. This particular refugee is
inscribed in the most potent masculinist project in Islam, for he is a “Mujahid.” It is his status as
a Mujahid that is incorporated into the national paradigm of sovereignty and, resultantly, Jihad
becomes the ultimate point of arrival for a male Muslim subjectivity. This international Jihad,
supported by the West and fought by the Afghans and their international volunteers, thus
becomes the ultimate self-legitimizing concept for the sovereign power in Pakistan. It is this
confluence of material and symbolic currents that creates the ideal conditions for the rise of the
Taliban not just as a movement but also as a mode of being in the world.
It is no secret that during the Afghan Jihad, the Pakistani government was actively
engaged in supporting the Mujahideen, but we should also remember that Zia-ul-Haq used Jihad
as a symbol to support other jihadist groups in the world as well. It is this prehistory of modern
Jihad that has constructed, both symbolically and materially, Pakistan into an ideal space for
Jihadists from all over the world. We must also remember that the concept of Jihad that
underwrites Zia’s regime (and also the current politics of the Taliban) is an extreme reading of
the concept itself. As I have argued elsewhere 3, a Talibanistic reading of the term “Jihad” is a
‘limit reading’ of the concept, just as their reading of the Sharia is a ‘limit reading.’ In this act of
reading the concepts at the limit of their semiotic and semantic forces, a Talibanistic imagination
focuses only on the most literalist and the most extreme interpretations of the concept. Thus,
even though Jihad is made central to their project, what is meant by “Jihad” is actually “Qital,”
which is the ultimate end point of the concept, not its beginning. Similarly, in terms of justice,
Hadd, the strictest punishments available under the Islamic law, become the norm. The system of
being in the world and the act of being human, thus, get inextricably connected with the power to
kill and the power to punish. Sharia is thus reduced to a simple system of swift justice practiced
through harsh punishments.
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In the traditional anti-Islamic writings in the US, all these developments are attributed to
the inherent flaws in the “Islamic sacred,” thus precluding any room for a materialist explanation
of the term Jihad]”. In fact, in one of my earlier projects as a graduate student, I myself was
guilty of making such hasty judgments. 4 But in order to fully engage with the rise of
fundamentalism in Pakistan, one must go beyond ideology and look at the material processes by
which fundamentalism is precipitated and one must acquire an intimate understanding of the
dispositif, or the apparatus within which subjectivity such as that of the Taliban finds its
expression. Michel Foucault, describes the term dispositif in one of his interviews in 1977:
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions,
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and
philanthropic propositions–in short, the said as much as the unsaid.
Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the
system of relations that can be established between these elements.
Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely
the nature of the connection that can exist between these
heterogeneous elements. Thus, a particular discourse can figure at
one time as the [programme] of an institution, and at another it can
function as a means of justifying or masking a practice which itself
remains silent, or as a secondary re-interpretation of this practice,
opening out for it a new field of rationality.
In short, between these elements, whether discursive or nondiscursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and
modifications of function which can also vary very widely.
(Foucault, 1977, pp.194-228)
Thus, in a way, one could say that all subjects are articulated or expressed within a complex
array of material and symbolic expressions of power, and one cannot, thus, attribute the creation
of subjects to just one locus or cause. In order to understand the rise of Taliban, therefore, one
must also, at least, attempt to understand the particular dispositif that structures Talibanistic
subjectivity. In Agamben’s explanation of Foucault’s usage of the term, a dispositif or apparatus
“is a decisive technical term in the strategy of Foucault’s thought,” (Agamben, 2009, p. 1) and,
Agamben suggests, “for Foucault, what is at stake is rather the investigation of concrete modes
in which the positivities (or apparatuses) act within the relationships, mechanisms, and ‘plays’ of
power” (2009, p. 6). The dispositif that structures Talibanistic subjectivity must, therefore, be
studied within this complexity. I believe that it is the neoliberalism, the Afghan-Soviet war, and
the rise of Zia-ul-Haq’s regime that constitute a sort of dispositif that becomes the ultimate
ground of expression of Talibanistic subjectivity.
This apparatus, or plane of emergence of the Taliban, however, also has its peculiar
differences from Foucault and Agamben’s discussions of biopolitics. In fact, as the bios and
politics of this dispositif are mobilized to affect human bodies, the state and the sovereign come
to increasingly define themselves through their power to kill and punish and not through, in
Foucault’s words, “the right to take life or let live” (HS, 1990, p. 136).
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The Afghan-Soviet war also provided the necessary conditions and the human capital to
be reshaped into not only the masculinist and Jihadist models of a so-called Islamic subjectivity
but also the purist model. Conceptually, while the culture foregrounded Jihad—in its version as
Qital as the main signifier of its masculinity—materially, the orphans produced by the war
became the docile bodies to be shaped into a particular kind of social weapon. According to
Ahmad Rashid, the Afghan Jihad provided Jameat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan a unique opportunity to
“set up hundreds of madrassas along the Pashtun belt in the NWFP and Baluchistan,” (1989, p.
89) and these madrassas become crucial in shaping and structuring these orphans into what they
would eventually become: the Taliban.
Defined through Jihad and a purist idea of a Muslim subjectivity, the Talib is a self
constantly attempting to fill the hole of non-being with dogma. If modernity and all its signifiers
become contaminants to a pure identity, then reshaping the entire project of modernity becomes
the ultimate quest, and any conceptual or material threats to this pursuit become suspect.
Increasingly, while these subjects are taking shape, emerging within the current state of
international capital, the state, having bought into the myth of progress through neoliberalism,
has lost any means of offering more complex (or secular) modes of experiencing the national life.
In such a scenario, the figure of the other (the minority, the woman) becomes the ultimate
marker of otherness. An otherness that must first be reduced to the role of a passive right-holder
and then mobilized to foreground the power of the state. The case of Aasia Bibi is a prime
example of such juridical and extra-juridical mobilization of passive bodies for the project of
power. While Aasia Bibi, a Christian citizen, was sentenced to death for alleged blasphemy
under the Pakistani blasphemy laws, the judge deciding her case went beyond his mandate to ban
any commutation or pardon of her sentence by the president of Pakistan, a power vested in the
presidency by the Pakistani constitution. Furthermore, so far, those who have attempted to speak
in support of Asia Bibi have also been silenced through private acts of violence: Salman Taseer,
the governor of Punjab, was murdered by one of his own security guards 5 for his vocal
opposition to the blasphemey laws, and Shahbaz Bhatti, the federal minister for minorities, was
also murdered for his stance against the Asia Bibni’s sentence and the blasphemy laws. It seems
that in case of Pakistan, the state and the Taliban may not be able to provide any redemptive
material help to their citizens, but they will certainly punish those who pose a threat to Islam or
insult its sacred symbols.
Thus, to sum up this inconclusive argument, death and the power to punish become the
ultimate mode of sovereignty in the Pakistani public sphere, and the minorities, as passive
citizens, become crucial to asserting the juridical power of the state and the power to kill with
impunity that has now come to be the hallmark of the politics of death espoused by our Taliban
brothers.
I will conclude with one example from Islamic history, without, as you might have
noticed, offering any neat solutions to the troubling questions that I have raised in this paper. As
a scholar, I believe, my primary job is to pose questions and not to provide neat or conclusive
answers. In his theorization of power, Foucault provides us the image of power as a web rather
than a hierarchical structure, for power, according to Foucault, “is everywhere, not because it
embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (HS, 1990, p. 93). In this web of
power, Foucault also acknowledges the existence of resistance as a “pre-given node” within the
tentacles of power. To add to this fascinating theory of power, one could say that in its
expression within a particular dispositif, power also performs a two-pronged move: It moves
upward to seek the body of the sovereign, and it courses through the body politic, seeking the
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weakest and the most vulnerable nodes within its web. Thus, in this two-pronged movement,
power latches on to the preexisting powerful nodes and intensifies its force by literally affecting
the very bodies and souls of the most vulnerable, the most disenfranchised within a specific
sphere. The ideal role of political power in Islam, in Sharia, had been to forestall and redirect this
two-pronged movement of power, which is best described in the words of Abu Bak’r, the first
caliph of Islam:
I have been given the authority over you, and I am not the best of
you. If I do well, help me; and if I do wrong, set me right. Sincere
regard for truth is loyalty and disregard for truth is treachery. The
weak amongst you shall be strong with me until I have secured his
rights, if God wills; and the strong amongst you shall be weak with
me until I have wrested from him the rights of others, if God wills.
Obey me so long as I obey God and His Messenger. But if I
disobey God and His Messenger, ye owe me no obedience. Arise
for your prayer, God have mercy upon you.
This was the initial, revolutionary potential of Islam that made Islam one of the most dominant
religions of its time: its potential to force power to move against its natural flow, its natural drift.
Unfortunately, our Taliban brothers and their sympathizers have only adopted a part of this
message: They all believe in social restructuring of the society and distribution of resources, but
they have forgotten that the primary role of the sovereign in Islam is to bend power so that it
redeems and enables the weak and that it does so without making the weak and their bodies the
very site of power’s self-presentation as absolute.

I have consistently suggested this in some of my previously published work as well. For details, see Raja 2007 and
2010.
2 I am relying here on Georgio Agamben's discussion of the Greek terms Bios and Zoē, according to which Zoē
“expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings” and Bios “indicated the form or way of living
proper to an individual or a group” (1). Within the symbolic terrain of 1971 election, both the parties would have
treated the minorities as Zoē (as bare life), but the chances of the minorities’ inclusion as Bios (as qualified life)
were higher within the class-associated politics of the Pakistan People’s Party, especially since the party was not
mobilizing Islam as the leading signifier of national identity.
1

3

See Raja 2009.
See Raja 2005.
5 The murderer was received as a hero by the fundamentalist groups and individuals, which points to the degree of
decay of the Pakistani public sphere.
4
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